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NELSON MALDONADO-TORRES
On the Coloniality of Human Rights
The universality of human rights is delimited by what is considered to effectively consti-
tute the state of being human in the first place. In addition to a secular-line that separa-
ted the divine from the human, the hegemonic modern Western concept of the human 
emerged in relation to an onto-Manichean colonial line that often makes human rights 
discourse inefficient for addressing modern colonialism, or complicit with it. For any 
decolonization of human rights to occur, there needs to be a decolonization of the 
concept of the human. Frantz Fanon’s prayer to his body in Black Skin, White Masks 
offers a basis for building a decolonial humanism and humanities that counter the 
coloniality of human rights and serve as propaedeutics for any effort to make human 
rights relevant for decolonization. 
Keywords: coloniality; colonialism; decolonization; Frantz Fanon (1925-1961); human 
rights.
It is widely recognized today that coloniality is not just colonialism. While colo-
nialism is typically considered to be a political arrangement that has existed 
since time immemorial, coloniality refers to the logic, culture, and structure of 
the modern world-system. As Quijano and Wallerstein stated in their analysis 
of Americanity and coloniality: “The Americas were not incorporated into 
an already existing capitalist world-economy. There could not have been a 
capitalist world-economy without the Americas” (Quijano and Wallerstein, 
1992: 549). This “world economy” had at its core a concept of “newness” 
that was inseparably tied to notions of social and global order that allowed 
relations of a colonial type to become a central feature of the unfolding “New 
World.” Rather than solely defining the relationship between Europe and the 
Americas, “as the centuries went by, the New World became the pattern, 
the model of the entire world-system” (ibidem: 449-450). 
While the Western concept of the human has always been a contested one, 
this does not mean that hegemonic key traits are lacking. This paper will iden-
tify some of those traits and critically review them with reference to colon- 
iality. In that sense, one of the goals of this essay is to contribute to the 
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analysis of the human and of human rights from the perspective of the 
coloniality of power, knowledge, and being (Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, 
2007; Lander, 2000; Maldonado-Torres, 2007; Mignolo, 2000, 2010, 2011; 
Quijano, 2000; Walsh, 2005; Walsh, Schiwy, and Castro-Gómez, 2002; 
Wynter, 2003). This literature can contribute significantly to human rights 
debates, and there is much to be gained in discussing human rights and the 
dominant Western idea of the human for the understanding of coloniality 
and, as will be seen, for the opposition to it. 
Any analysis that critically engages the structures and ideas that sustain 
coloniality would be incomplete without considering the other side of the 
challenge that coloniality creates: decolonization. Just as European socie-
ties experienced a colonizing turn that led them to an understanding of 
civilization that authorized colonization in the globalized New World that 
they sought to create (see Césaire, 2000), a decolonial turn also took place 
globally, one that refused to consider colonialism as secondary in the analysis 
of modernity and that proposed decolonization as an unfinished project (see 
Ballestrin, 2013; Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel, 2007; Maldonado-Torres, 
2006, 2006-2007, 2011, 2017). 
The decolonial turn consists of the shift from the acceptance of inferiority 
and the conditions of slavery to the assumption of the position of a questioner. 
It is a position that entails not only a skepticism of the a priori superiority 
of Europe, but also radical doubt about the lack of the full humanity of the 
colonized. As a result of this turn, the colonized subject emerges not only as 
a questioner but also as an embodied being who seeks to become an agent. 
From here the two basic dimensions of the decolonial turn: the identifica-
tion of colonialism as a fundamental problem (see Césaire 2000: 32), and the 
idea of decolonization as a continued and unfinished project (Grosfoguel, 
Maldonado-Torres, and Saldívar, 2005; Maldonado-Torres, 2017). 
Along with identifying and critically revising dominant ideas of the human 
from the perspective of coloniality, I will examine recent literature in the 
study of decolonization and human rights. Absent in such discussions is 
the relevance of coloniality and the decolonial turn. Césaire and his former 
student, Frantz Fanon, will be introduced as key figures in the decolonial 
turn, as they challenged the hegemonic Western concept of the human and 
called for a new definition of humanity on the basis of the practices of the 
colonized. Decolonization, for figures such as Césaire and Fanon, is more 
basic than preconceived concepts of the human and any notion of rights. 
This is a missing point in the recent literature on human rights and decolo-
nization, and one to which the analysis of coloniality and the decolonial turn 
have much to contribute. In addition to Césaire and Fanon, I will integrate 
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aspects of the work of Walter Mignolo, Gayatri Spikak, and Sylvia Wynter. 
Their views help to further expand the importance of decolonial humanities 
and social movements in face of the coloniality of human rights. 
I. From the “Oration” to the “Declaration”: Tracing the Meaning of the 
Human in Human Rights 
In Inventing Human Rights: A History, Lynn Hunt offers an overview of the 
history of human rights from the late eighteenth century to the twentieth, 
cited here as a point of reference in order to clarify the contributions of 
decolonial thinking to reflections on human rights. The claim is not that 
each contribution is a totally new invention, but that they help to challenge 
certain tendencies in human rights discourse, such as the notion of a linear 
and triumphal development of human rights, as well as underscore the 
importance of the analysis of coloniality in human rights discourse. 
The first point to highlight in Hunt’s account of human rights is that 
while she begins the analysis of human rights with the eighteenth-century 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the United States’ 
Declaration of Independence, she notes that 
During the eighteenth century, in English and in French, ‘human rights,’ ‘rights of 
mankind,’ and ‘rights of humanity’ all proved to be too general to be of direct political 
use. They referred to what distinguished humans from the divine on one end of the 
scale and from animals on the other, rather than to politically relevant rights such as 
freedom of speech or the right to participate in politics. (Hunt, 2007: 23)
This observation calls attention, not only to the usually referenced 
“seventeenth-century revolution in political thinking” that started with the 
works of Hugo Grotius and John Locke (Hunt, 2007: 60), but also with 
earlier figures and pivotal intellectual moments that advanced these fun-
damental distinctions that Hunt mentions here. Walter Mignolo points in 
the right direction when he asserts early on in his analysis of human rights 
that “Concepts such as ‘man’ and ‘human’ were an invention of European 
humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, an invention that served 
them well for several purposes” (Mignolo, 2009: 8). One of these purposes 
was for humanists “to detach themselves… from the control of the Church” 
(ibidem), which points to the role of notions akin to “human rights” in an 
emerging discourse and consciousness of having some autonomy from 
Christian-centered frameworks for understanding the world. 
In short, the philosophical exploration of the “Rights of Man” is part of the 
larger humanistic, and increasingly secular, project of creating clear lines of 
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demarcation and distinction between the divine, the human, and the animal 
world. The difference between God, human beings, and animals was gener-
ally understood in the medieval Christian world and in the Renaissance in 
terms of a “great chain of being,” a concept present in the work of Aristotle 
and of Neoplatonists such as Plotinus, who influenced Christian theology. 
The assertion of the “Rights of Man” in the eighteenth century testifies to 
a long process of debate about the characterization of the chain of being 
and the place of “Man” in it. It is a debate that can be traced back to artis- 
tic and literary works from the twelfth to the sixteenth-century that started 
to express the notion that there was something inherently valuable in human 
activity and human production. If similar works had been created in the past, 
it was now that they were collectively making, or being appropriated to make, 
an impact on what was later going to become “Western” consciousness.
Perhaps the clearest text that went in the direction of finding an alterna-
tive conception of “Man” was Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s “Oration 
on the Dignity of Man” (Pico della Mirandola, 1956, originally published in 
1486 as Oratio de hominis dignitate), which is often depicted as a manifesto 
of the European Renaissance (see, for example, Wynter, 2003, which is key 
in the present approach to the Oration). In the Oration, as Sylvia Wynter 
points out, “Pico rewrote the Judeo-Christian origin narrative of Genesis” 
(Wynter, 2003: 276). He tells the Christian story of the creation of the world 
in a way that positions “Man” between God and animals. “Man” appears as 
a being who is endowed with an open-ended set of possibilities in compari-
son to nature and animals, which are prescribed one meaning or function 
by the Creator. The Oration is an essay with philosophical content but not 
a traditional philosophical treatise per se. It uses literary devices such as 
storytelling to convey a concept and an image with the view of “Man” that 
Renaissance artists, scientists, and philosophers were also putting forward. 
It is very illuminating that while one finds the most direct and influ-
ential initial assertion of the dignity of “Man” in an “Oration,” the most 
explicit and perhaps enduring claims to the “Rights of Man” is found in 
“Declarations” – the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. These are two different genres with 
different presuppositions and implications. The Latin word oratio means 
‘discourse’ as well as ‘prayer,’ and Pico’s text concludes with a prayer: “let 
us now, with the prayer that the outcome may be fortunate and favorable, 
as to the sound of the trumpets, join battle” (Pico della Mirandola, 1956: 
69). The assertion of the dignity of Man is both a discourse and a prayer, 
simultaneously directed to peers as well as to someone who is beyond the 
limits of the worldly sphere. The prayer is, rhetorically at least, a humble 
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recognition of something beyond. This is different from a “declaration” in 
which there is the sense of the creation of a new beginning or at least the 
assumption of a status already enjoyed but not fully understood or adopted 
until it is formally declared. 
Hunt’s analysis of the overwhelming use of the notion of rights before 
the “declarations” that she studies suggest that if the “oration” is at the 
start of a process that seeks to fundamentally rethink the premises of the 
Christian understanding of humanity (with reference to the chain of being), 
the “declarations” reflect a moment of assertion where a new social order 
can be built on the basis of the discursive space and practices opened up by 
the “oration.” This does not mean that there is a direct line between one and 
the other, or that everything that is found in the “declarations” is already 
present in the “oration,” but that the “oration” initiates a reflection upon the 
human in which the notion of rights will appear. Between the “oration” and 
the “declarations” one finds that multiple other modes of writing or genres 
were used in the effort to clarify the new emerging concept of the human. 
They included the “meditations” and the “discourse” (as in Descartes’ 
Meditations on First Philosophy and Descartes’ Discourse on Method as 
well as Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and Discourse on 
the Arts and Sciences), the “essay” (as in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding) and the “treatise” (as in Locke’s Two Treatises on 
Government and David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature), among others. 
For the purposes of the discussion at hand, I will focus on the late fifteenth 
century “oration” and the late eighteenth century “declarations.” 
Two reasons underlie the importance of reflecting in greater depth upon 
the nature of Pico’s Oration and the U.S. Declaration of Independence 
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and what they reveal about an 
increasingly hegemonic idea of the human. The first is that such a reflection 
contributes to the understanding of the meaning and significance of the 
twentieth-century Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which in turn 
directly informs the most recent and contemporary uses of human rights 
discourse. This concern is central for Hunt and this reflection should be 
viewed as a complement to what she discusses. The second reason is that 
the distinction between the “oration” and the “declaration” helps to better 
understand decolonization and the decolonial turn. 
Following the lead of Sylvia Wynter (Wynter, 1984, 2003), the argument 
here is that the work of figures such as Césaire and Fanon is characterized by 
the effort to engage in a new “oration,” that is to say, a new reflection on and a 
new practice of being human. This is different from the idea of making a “dec-
laration” or wanting to be included in one, which is not without significance 
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as both Césaire and Fanon lived in the context of a renewed declaration of 
human rights. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Césaire published his manifesto about 
decolonization, Discourse on Colonialism, in 1950 and Fanon published his 
first book, a classic in the understanding of blackness and colonization, Black 
Skin, White Masks, in 1952. This does not mean that the new “declaration” 
was irrelevant for the anti-colonial struggle. To the extent that the European 
powers were committed to it, it was important for the colonized to infuse 
the Declaration with ideas that would make it appear incompatible with 
segregation and colonialism. The new Declaration could also be used in the 
newly independent countries to criticize political formations that ignored the 
value of the individual. However, Césaire and Fanon were pointing to a more 
fundamental task the equivalent of which, if there is any, is a discourse along 
the lines of Pico’s Oration, with significant differences, of course. 
The fundamental difference between Pico’s humanistic turn, and 
Césaire’s and Fanon’s decolonial turn is that while the former sought to 
challenge the Christian discourse of the chain of being by putting Man in a 
more central position than before, Césaire and Fanon challenged the mod-
ern/colonial order and its various forms of coloniality from the embodied 
positionality and lived experience of the colonized. The problem that Césaire 
and Fanon encountered was that the effort made in European countries 
to find a place for Man involved the creation of a new entity separate from 
God and nature or animals. Following Fanon, I refer to this new entity as 
the damnés (condemned; Fanon, 2004). 
In addition to a secular-line that distinguishes the space of Man from the 
realm of the divine, the concept of the human that becomes dominant in 
the West – and dominant does not mean that it was not contested in some 
important ways, or that it has completely imposed itself over every other 
conception – also poses a colonial or color-line that makes it possible to 
distinguish humans from non-humans and to think of humanity in terms of 
degrees – that one can be more or less human (Maldonado-Torres, 2015). 
In its most extreme form, this line is one that distinguishes different forms 
of being, or so posed Frantz Fanon when he described colonialism as a form 
of Manicheism (Fanon, 2004: 6). Manicheism makes reference to a divide 
between an essentially defined good and an essentially defined evil. In Fanon’s 
work, this appears, not as a religious formation, but as an onto -Manichean-
-line that defines and delimits the space of authentic humanity and separates 
it from lesser forms of humanity. The Renaissance Humanist revolution, 
the eighteenth century psychological literature that Hunt discusses, and the 
declarations of independence and the “Rights of Man” have to be understood 
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not only in relation to the emergence and expansion of secularism, but also 
in relation to this onto-Manichean-line and coloniality. 
The onto-Manichean colonial-line is perhaps the most basic and primary 
expression of coloniality, understood as the production of ontological dif-
ferences hierarchically organized in colonial forms as part of the modern 
civilizational order. In this sense, the colonial-line can also be referred 
to as the modern/colonial-line. The modern/colonial-line is responsible 
for dividing the world in lighter zones, closer to civilization, and darker 
zones, closer to contexts defined by early death and torture – torture being 
worse than death itself. In that sense, both the European Renaissance and 
Enlightenment, which are typically identified with civilization, also had what 
Walter Mignolo has called their “darker side” (Mignolo, 2003). 
The modern/colonial onto-Manichean line has been theorized in multiple 
ways, including as an abyssal line (Santos, 2007) and with reference to the 
production of gender (Lugones, 2007). I join Sylvia Wynter and Lewis 
Gordon in following Frantz Fanon’s lead to explore ontological colonial 
difference in terms of damnation and then examine its relationship with 
decolonization, all of which contributes to determining the coloniality of 
human rights with more precision (Wynter, 2001; Gordon, 2005, 2015). 
Damnation is a form of onto-Manichean differentiation that includes racial 
difference but it is more fundamental. The onto-Manichean colonial-line 
or line of damnation creates two zones: a zone of salvation where the world 
and its resources are perceived as being there “for our sake” (propter nos; 
see Wynter, 1991), and another that is populated by entities whose very 
existence is regarded as problematic and dangerous. Since the world is 
perceived to be best without these entities, ideally, they would disappear 
after their bodies are used to build civilization and to satisfy the needs 
of the civilized. In the worst case scenario, the condemned remain alive 
but only outside of the zone of civilization, or having limited access to it. 
The task of managing the modern/colonial-line so as to determine how and 
at what speed subjects marked as condemned can have access to which 
area of ‘civilization’ is what today is meant by diversity and inclusion (at the 
level of civil society and the institutions of the nation-state) and development 
(at the geopolitical level). From a Fanonian point of view, diversity, inclu-
sion, and development are forms of coloniality that should be distinguished 
from decolonization. They all work within the modern/colonial order of 
things and fail to address the specificity of damnation and the lived experi-
ence of the damnés.
Damnation is the starting point where Fanon considers the possibility of 
a new concept of the human. Instead of inclusion into the existing dominant 
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humanism, Fanon argued for “a new start,” “a new way of thinking,” and for 
the creation of a “new man” (Fanon, 2004: 239). If there is to be a humanism, 
from Fanon’s point of view, it is one that emerges from this “new humanity” 
and one “written into the objectives and methods of the struggle” (ibidem: 
178). Fanon was talking more about reinitiating the process through which 
we arrive at a shared notion of the human than about relying on already exist-
ing ideas about it. The origin of those ideas did not matter for Fanon: they 
could have come from European countries or from local traditions. In that 
sense, Fanon’s critique of the existing Western humanism and human rights 
discourse in his time was not simply based on the rejection of Eurocentrism 
or the defense of local cultures. With regard to understanding the human, 
both the perspectives that originated in Europe and those that originated 
in the local colonial societies, however universalist they had aspired to be, 
had to give way to the more basic task of the affirmation of the collective 
humanity of the dehumanized in decolonization struggles. 
For Fanon, decolonization was the response to a form of radical sepa-
ration between some humans and others. This response was to be a very 
material, and indeed corporal, exercise: “Let us decide not to imitate 
Europe and let us tense our muscles and our brains in a new direction. 
Let us endeavor to invent a man in full, something which Europe has been 
incapable of achieving” (ibidem: 236). Fanon found that “the European 
spirit is built on strange foundations” and called for the creation of a new 
material, practical, and intellectual basis to define the human (ibidem). This 
meant that the colonized could not simply rely on former “declarations” of 
“We, the People” or of the “Rights of Man.” This also meant that decoloniza- 
tion is a much more profound activity than simply obtaining independence. 
For that reason, more than just calling for declarations of rights or indepen-
dence that built on the dominant view of the human, he engaged in a form 
of “oration,” not about the dignity of Man, but about the condition of the 
damnés and their struggle for liberation. 
Fanon starts his “oration” in his first book, Black Skin, White Masks and 
it is one that continues through his books up through Wretched of the Earth. 
My suggestion here is that Fanon’s concept of decolonization is not only 
the result of the imperatives of struggle in a war for independence, but a 
practice that is sustained by a philosophical anthropology that he started 
to elaborate beginning with his first book Black Skin, White Masks. In that 
sense, there is a fundamental continuity among various forms of discontinu-
ity in Fanon’s writings. This essay will limit itself to shedding more light on 
the concept of Fanon’s “oration” and link it to the form of agency that he 
calls for in Black Skin, White Masks and in Wretched of the Earth. 
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The reference to “oration” cannot be more straightforward in Black 
Skin, White Masks. Consider that Fanon concludes his text, much like Pico, 
with a prayer: 
My final prayer: 
O my body, always make me a man who questions! (Fanon, 2008: 205) 
The prayer is not simply an innocent rhetorical device in Black Skin, 
White Masks. The reference to the prayer comes after several discussions 
about the positionality of the Black subject and of the narrator/analyst in 
the text. It starts with reference to the narrator/analyst (Fanon himself) not 
being “the bearer of absolute truths” at the beginning of the book, along 
with the idea that he considers it necessary to say “some things” and that 
he will “say” them, “not shout,” because he had “long given up shouting” 
(Fanon, 2004: xi). The suggestion here is that prayer plays a role in the 
transition from shouting to saying. The “things” that Fanon indicates in 
the introduction, ones which must be said, emerge as a response to the 
questions that the body in prayer makes possible. The body is the source of 
the questions and the prayer to the body – from the body – is for the body 
itself to remain open, which is why Fanon characterizes the body as “the 
open dimension of every consciousness” (Fanon, 2008: 205). 
The prayer is for the body to serve as a site of questions, for which it 
has to shed the “masks” that colonial subjects wear in order to attempt to 
appear as human in a context defined by coloniality. The prayer is about 
shedding the masks, emerging as a subject who questions, and, as a result, 
finally being able to “touch the other, feel the other, discover each other” 
(ibidem). These are the conditions of possibility for the damnés to find each 
other and join in the revolutionary struggle.
The path from Black Skin, White Masks to Wretched of the Earth is 
one of a journey from prayer to questioning, to saying, and to doing with 
others who are also engaged in the struggle for decolonization. Whatever 
‘human’ means beyond “being with a body” is to be enacted, practiced, 
and established in a process that begins with a prayer. The “declaration” is 
more like a way of saying, or maybe shouting, depending on the case, as if 
one is the bearer of absolute truths. This attitude and point of departure is 
what Fanon wishes to question. Instead, praying, departing from the very 
condition of being an embodied subject in damnation, becomes his new 
point of departure for what could end up being a new humanity. 
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II. Decolonization and the Coloniality of Twentieth-Century Human Rights 
While Fanon was so deeply engaged in his “oration” and in the process of 
decolonization, the crisis of Europe in the Second World War had led the 
United States, European countries, and the Allies to engage in yet another 
“declaration.” This was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As Hunt 
points out, this declaration expanded the number of inalienable rights typi-
cally recognized in uses of human rights: it “prohibited slavery and provided 
for universal and equal suffrage by secret ballot. In addition, it called for 
freedom of movement, the right to a nationality, the right to marry, and more 
controversially, the right to social security; the right to work, with equal pay 
for equal work at a life-sustaining wage; the right to rest and leisure; and the 
right to education, which should be free at the elementary levels” (Hunt, 
2007: 204). For Hunt, this represented a triumphant return to the human 
rights discourse, now anchored institutionally in the nation-state as well as 
above and beyond the nation-state, in the form of the United Nations and 
in international courts of justice. 
Consistent with her triumphalist and evolutionary framework, Hunt 
concludes her book on the invention of human rights with the idea that 
“The human rights framework, with its international bodies, international 
courts, and international conventions, might be exasperating in its slowness 
to respond or repeated inability to achieve its ultimate goals, but there is no 
better structure available for confronting these issues” (ibidem: 213). The idea 
is that human rights went from their appearance in the context of debates 
about the place of the human in relation to God and to the animal world, 
to “declarations” that invoked specific political rights for individuals, to a 
new declaration in the twentieth-century that responded to the devastating 
effects of totalitarianism and included a larger number of inalienable rights. 
Using a similar evolutionary model, Roland Burke argues that the larger 
expansion of these rights in the twentieth-century cannot be properly 
understood without the effect of decolonization (Burke, 2010). Burke’s 
Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (2010) is 
one of the few studies dedicated to examining the impact of decolonization 
in twentieth-century human rights discourse. He argues that, starting in 
the 1940’s and 1950’s, delegates from Asia and Africa who were opposing 
colonialism in various forums embraced human rights and its emphasis 
on universality and the value of the individual. In the process, they helped 
to cement and expand human rights. However, later on in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, with the spread of various forms of authoritarianism in Africa and 
Asia, leaders in these regions started to denounce human rights as not being 
much more than cultural imperialism. 
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Burke’s argument about the productive role of anticolonial and decolo-
nization struggles in twentieth-century human rights discourse also appears 
in recent texts by Fabian Klose (2013 [2009]) and Meredith Terretta (2012), 
all of whom intentionally seek to fill a vacuum in the literature. While Burke 
and Klose focus on anticolonial leaders and colonial administrators who 
openly engaged in human rights debates, Terretta focuses on an “anti-
-colonial activists who did invoke human rights as a way of delegitimizing 
colonial rule” (Terretta, 2012: 331). An aspect that they have in common 
is the evolutionary perspective that is so clear in Burke’s and Hunt’s work. 
Jan Eckel targets this tendency as the object of critique in his review essay 
of Burke’s and Klose’s books. He also questions the notion that human 
rights discourse had the level of significance that Burke and Klose find in 
the struggle for decolonization. For Eckel, 
The role of human rights in anticolonial thought is a question of proportions. It is 
true that in the vast number of anticolonial pamphlets numerous authors can be 
found who at one time or another adopted the term ‘human rights.’ However, they 
are outweighed by the sheer mass of texts that do not mention it at all. Many more 
political activists could be cited who simply did not refer to human rights… (Eckel, 
2010: 115) 
Eckel also cites Nkruhma and Fanon among those at the other end of 
the spectrum who denounced human rights and related principles as hypo-
critical (Eckel, 2010: 116-117; see also Moyn, 2014 for a similar approach 
to Eckel’s).
In his response to Eckel, Klose considers that Eckel’s analysis is 
Eurocentric because it declares that “metropolitan governments were 
arguably the most important actors in the process of decolonization” (cited 
in Klose, 2014; original in Eckel, 2010: 123). In fact, there are forms of 
Eurocentrism in both accounts. On the one hand there is the evolutionist, 
developmentalist, and triumphalist view of Klose, Burke, and Terretta, 
along with Hunt, which subordinates the struggle for decolonization to a 
progressive historical line that misses the ways in which Third World figures 
questioned the basis of the dominant understanding of the human. From 
this perspective, criticisms of human rights discourse can only appear as 
attempts to shield emerging forms of authoritarianism in the former colonies 
from critique (Burke, 2010: 4), which is far too simplistic, as Eckel notes 
(2010: 122). 
On the other hand, there is Eurocentrism in the analysis of Eckel, who 
not only fails to give due consideration to decolonization movements, 
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but who is also unable to identify the original ways in which Third World 
figures engaged the idea of the human beyond their specific responses to 
human rights discourse. Missing this originality is what opens the door 
for him to claim that “metropolitian governments were arguably the most 
important actors in the process of decolonization” (Eckel, 2010: 123). Eckel 
is concerned with the “cultural relativist turn” of Third World leaders in 
the 1970s, but misses the “decolonial turn” that figures like Aimé Césaire 
and Fanon propose in their work in the 1950s and 1960s. 
As we have seen, the decolonial turn is a shift of perspective and atti-
tude that poses colonialism as a fundamental problem and decolonization 
as a project. Fanon’s understanding of decolonization as the condition of 
possibility to start a new thinking and concrete realization of humanity 
is a reflection of this turn. For Fanon, modern colonialism is not a slight 
deviation or problem created by Western countries in their march to an 
ever more encompassing understanding of freedom and equality, but the 
primary ground of the most widespread understandings of humanity in the 
modern/colonial world. Decolonization from the modern/colonial matrix 
of power, knowledge, and being is likewise the primary ground of any new 
decolonial view of humanity. 
The decolonial turn was also present in the work of Césaire, who, 
shortly after the publication of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
conducted an incisive analysis of Nazism and the turn to human rights. 
For Césaire, the turn to human rights was a limited response to an inad-
equately formulated problem. The problem at the moment was predomi-
nantly conceived in European countries and the United States in terms 
of Nazism and anti-semitism, and not in the wider context of colonialism 
and racism. And when Europeans were pushed to consider the problem 
of colonialism, the response that Césaire found was that colonialism was 
different from Nazism because colonialism was a means of civilizing the 
colonized. This led Césaire to conclude that if “the very humanistic, very 
Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century” railed against Hitler, then he 
was being inconsistent and that, in fact, what he could not “forgive Hitler 
for is not crime in itself, the crime against man, it is not the humiliation of 
man as such, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the 
white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures 
which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, 
the coolies of India, and the blacks of Africa” (Césaire, 2000: 36). Césaire 
considered this form of thinking a trait of what he referred to as “pseudo-
-humanism” a form of humanism that “for too long it has diminished the 
rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been – and still is – narrow 
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and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things considered, sordidly 
racist” (ibidem: 37). 
That Césaire considered that European “pseudo-humanism” had “dimin-
ished the rights of man” does not mean that his approach to colonialism 
was limited to a mere affirmation of the universality of human rights, just 
as it does not mean that he did not believe in some kind of universality. 
To start, Césaire concludes the Discourse with a call for Europe to engage, 
not in a “revolution in methods,” but in “the Revolution” (ibidem: 78). 
That is, Césaire was a committed communist whose idea of universalism 
was more connected to Marxism than to liberal individualism and human 
rights discourse. Césaire ended up distancing himself from the Communist 
party and its brand of universalism, but not because he took a liberal turn. 
After explaining his preference for concrete forms of fraternity and solidar-
ity in his letter of resignation from the French Communist Party he asserts: 
I shall anticipate an objection.
Provincialism? Not at all. I am not burying myself in a narrow particularism. But 
neither do I want to lose myself in an emaciated universalism. There are two ways to 
lose oneself: walled segregation in the particular or dilution in the ‘universal.’
My conception of the universal is that of a universal enriched by all that is parti- 
cular, a universal enriched by every particular: the deepening and coexistence of all 
particulars.
And so? So we need to have the patience to take up the task anew; the strength to 
redo that which has been undone; the strength to invent instead of follow; the strength 
to ‘invent’ our path and to clear it of ready-made forms, those petrified forms that 
obstruct it. (Césaire, 2010 [1956]: 104) 
Here we have again, prior to Fanon’s sentences in The Wretched of the 
Earth, the idea of the main task in the struggle for decolonization and anti-
-racism as being not the extension of existing universalisms, either Marxist 
or liberal, or, for that matter, of existing provincialisms or culturalisms, but 
a series of struggles aimed at bringing about the humanity of the colonized 
and in that process letting them discover or define what they take the uni-
versality of humanity to be. 
III. Decoloniality, the Human, the Humanities and Human Rights
Césaire and Fanon are pointing to an idea that appears in the recent work of 
figures such as Mignolo and Gayatri Spivak. In their critical analysis of human 
rights discourse they focus on the question of “who speaks for the human in 
human rights?” (Mignolo, 2009), or, as Spivak formulates it, the discontinuity 
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between human rights advocates, including advocates of human rights in the 
South, and “those whom they protect” (Spivak, 2011: 82). Their common 
concern is that there is a pattern in which the definition of human rights leads 
to the creation of experts who are designated to speak to the colonized and 
other marginalized peoples about the rights that they possess. 
In response to this issue, Spivak calls for a new kind of education for 
children in poor rural areas in the Global South (ibidem). That is, the goal is 
not to have experts in human rights addressing the denial of various sorts of 
rights among the rural poor, but creating the conditions for the rural poor 
themselves to engage in the process of affirming their humanity and defin-
ing it and their rights – if that is the way in which they think that defining 
their humanity is most appropriate. For Spivak, this calls for the creation 
of a new kind of humanities education that attempts to be “an uncoercive 
rearrangement of desires” (ibidem: 81). Parallel to this, Mignolo calls for 
a “de-colonial humanities” and for a form of “de-colonial thinking” that 
does not arrogate “upon itself the right to having the last word about what 
human is,” but proposes instead “that there is no need for someone specific 
to talk about the human, because human is what we are talking about” 
(Mignolo, 2009: 23). 
Leaving the discussion and critical analysis of Mignolo’s and Spivak’s 
proposals for the moment, there are nevertheless two considerations that 
connect with other points in this essay. First, Mignolo’s and Spivak’s calls for 
new humanities would seem to resonate with Hunt’s idea that human rights 
have needed more than philosophical debates to reach a sense of the human 
on which human rights can find a base. Hunt focuses on epistolary novels 
in the late eighteenth century. But epistolary novels themselves, or literature 
at large alone, will not do this work, or so Mignolo’s and Spivak’s analyses 
suggest. Likewise, no ordinary conception of the humanities would do either. 
Also, what these new humanities would offer is not so much the basis for 
empathizing with others, which is Hunt’s focus, so much as the possibility 
of dispelling any sense of inferiority and motivating a process of self and col-
lective affirmation directed to end coloniality. The goal is rather to eliminate 
the forms of skepticism about the full humanity of the colonized, including the 
idea that the colonized needs to wear masks in order to appear as a human. 
It would be in that process that the condemned would know themselves and be 
in the position to more fully grasp and articulate their own view of the human. 
In that sense, a text such as Black Skin, White Masks, which seeks to critically 
intervene in the process of subject formation of the Black, almost as a clinical 
procedure, to motivate him/her to strive to become an agent, would be a key 
representative of these new decolonial humanities. In turn, this means that, 
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in spite of their differences, Spivak’s and Mignolo’s reflections on human rights 
can be seen as an extension of Fanon’s decolonial turn. Fanon’s decolonial 
turn is sustained with a prayer to the body to always make him someone who 
questions. In this prayer, we can find the basis for a decolonial humanities that 
can serve as a counter to the coloniality of human rights and as propaedeutics 
for any attempt to make human rights significant for decolonization. 
The second point is that, taken seriously, the call for decolonial humani-
ties takes us away from the existing humanities and the modern Western 
university. The existing humanities presuppose a division between them, 
the sciences, professional education, and the world outside the university. 
The decolonial humanities takes us back to a point prior to these divisions, 
as in Pico’s Oration, but also to a different body, subjectivity, and geopoliti-
cal location, as in Fanon’s prayer or Gloria Anzaldúa’s wound (Anzaldúa, 
2007). A decolonial humanities takes us in the direction of decolonial 
thinking, creating, and acting at large beyond disciplinary divisions and the 
strictures of method. It takes us towards the eradication of coloniality and 
to the formation of communities that emerge or are cultivated in this very 
struggle, including new universities (Santos, 2003). 
One can further develop the notion of decolonial humanities as a coun-
ter to the coloniality of human rights by distinguishing different layers in 
the expression of coloniality. The first layer is that of the coloniality that is 
part of the notion of the human in the hegemonic concept of human rights. 
This is tied to the “oration” of the Renaissance and to the “declarations” 
of independence and of the Rights of Man. The problem with this layer of 
the coloniality of human rights is that the concept of the human is loaded 
with ideas about secularism, individualism, and racism that motivate cer-
tain problematic forms of skepticism about what constitutes being human. 
The skepticism in question expresses itself in the doubt about the full human-
ity of the damnés. Fanon’s prayer, which involves a full appreciation of the 
body of the damné as a source of questions, is a counter to this Manichean 
misanthropic skepticism (Maldonado-Torres, 2007). In this sense, 
the decolonial humanities are grounded as much on a radical questioning of 
the onto-Manichean colonial line as on a rejection of the essentialistic division 
between body and mind. The vulnerable body and subject who seeks to be 
open and ask questions becomes an indicator of a sense of humanity that 
the damnés and others who join them can claim in common in the struggle 
for decolonization. 
The second layer in the coloniality of human rights is that of human 
right activists, both in the north and south, who, as Mignolo and Spivak 
discuss, speak about the human more than they speak to and work with 
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the condemned. They seem to engage in the performative contradiction of 
denying humanity in the very process of seeking to affirm human rights. 
More than just calling for a more consistent application of human rights, 
Mignolo and Spivak call for the formation of a new framework of educa-
tion and humanities. This is consistent with the decolonial turn in Césaire 
and Fanon, which considers the very struggle for decolonization as a more 
fundamental task than the exploration and assertion of human rights. To be 
sure, Césaire and Fanon would insist on the importance of recognizing the 
terrain of these decolonial humanities beyond the school and the university. 
Given the modern/colonial design of knowledge in the university, it should 
not be surprising that the decolonial humanities are found mainly across 
and outside universities – in social, artistic, and intellectual movements. 
Contributing to those projects is critical for the advancement of decoloni-
zation. This does not mean that human rights cannot be used strategically 
in the struggle for decolonization if they proved helpful. But this strategic 
use is not a defense of human rights in principle or a commitment with any 
particular formulation. 
Finally, there is the coloniality of the scholars of human rights, such as 
Lynn Hunt, Roland Burke, and Fabian Klose, among others, who tend 
to have, in the words of Ibhawoh, “a rather triumphant vision of the role 
of rights talk in securing progressive and transformative social change” 
(Ibhawoh, 2007: 2). Added to that, there is also the Eurocentrism of scholars 
such as Eckel, who criticize those triumphalist narratives but whose lack of 
substantive attention to the lived experience and condition of the colonized, 
as well as to discourses produced by intellectuals from the colonial world, 
lead them to over-value the activities and even the intellectual production 
of the former colonizing countries and miss the specific contributions from 
the colonial world. Césaire’s and Fanon’s work introduce a decolonial turn, 
different from Eurocentrism and cultural relativism, that seeks to ground 
whatever is universal in humanity in the very struggles of the colonized in 
affirming their humanity. 
Edited by Scott M. Culp
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Sobre a colonialidade  
dos Direitos Humanos 
A universalidade dos direitos humanos é, 
em primeiro lugar, delimitada pelo que 
é considerado constituir efectivamente 
o estado de ser humano. Além de uma 
linha secular que separou o divino do 
humano, o conceito hegemónico ocidental 
De la colonialité des  
Droits Humains 
L’universalité des droits humains est, en 
premier lieu, déterminée par ce qu’il est 
convenu d’appeler l’état d’être humain. 
En plus d’une ligne séculière qui a séparé le 
divin de l’humain, le concept hégémonique 
occidental moderne de l’être humain est 
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moderno do ser humano surgiu em rela-
ção a uma linha colonial maniqueísta 
que muitas vezes torna o discurso dos 
direitos humanos ineficaz para abordar o 
colonialismo moderno ou cúmplice dele. 
Para que ocorra a descolonização dos 
direitos humanos tem de haver uma 
descolonização do conceito de humano. 
A oração de Franz Fanon ao seu corpo em 
Black Skin, White Masks oferece uma base 
para a construção de um humanismo e 
humanidades descoloniais que combatem 
a colonialidade dos direitos humanos e 
servem de propedêutica para qualquer 
esforço que vise tornar os direitos humanos 
relevantes para a descolonização. 
Palavras-chave: colonialidade; colonia-
lismo; descolonização; direitos humanos; 
Frantz Fanon (1925-1961).
apparu en relation à une ligne coloniale 
manichéiste qui, maintes fois, rend ineffi-
cace le discours des droits humains dans 
l’approche du colonialisme moderne ou 
en fait son complice. Pour que la décolo-
nisation des droits humains ait lieu, il faut 
qu’existe une décolonisation du concept 
d’humain. La prière de Franz Fanon à son 
corps dans Black Skin, White Masks offre 
une base à la construction d’un humanisme 
et d’humanités décoloniaux luttant contre 
la colonialité des droits humains et servent 
de propédeutique à tout effort permettant 
que les droits humains soient importants 
pour la décolonisation.
Mots-clés: colonialité; colonialisme; déco-
lonisation; droits humains; Frantz Fanon 
(1925-1961).
